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Abstract
Following Wittgenstein’s call to imagine law as a way of life (1958), we can envisage environmental law and environ-
mentalism as a way of living beautifully. Employing George Santayana’s aesthetic theory (1896, 1905, 1910), this article 
explores environmentally engaged citizenship as more than a mere ideological manifestation of subjectivity. A multifaceted 
relationship between individuals and their environment, it manifests itself through their ideology, political subjectivity, but 
also through aesthetic subjectivity. Using Juliana v. USA as a case study, this article examines civic engagement taking into 
consideration its deeply ideological and aesthetic nature.
Keywords Environmentally engaged citizenship · Aesthetic ideology · Environmentalism · Sustainable capitalism
Introduction
Following Wittgenstein’s call to imagine law as a way of 
life (1958), this is a call to envisage environmental law and 
environmentalism as a way of living beautifully. It employs 
George Santayana’s aesthetic theory (1896, 1905, 1910) to 
propose a new paradigm for environmentally engaged citi-
zenship. This call, while new in its intersectional and dia-
lectical approach to law, ideology, and aesthetics, builds on 
well-known works on the “good citizen” (Schudson 1998); 
on ethical aesthetic of environmental movements (Leopold, 
1966); and works about environmental political activism 
(Stegner 1980; Carson 2018).
This new paradigm builds on the multifaceted relation-
ship between individuals and their environment. It views 
environmentally engaged citizenship as a manifestation 
of individual public subjectivity—or ideology (Neacşu 
2020)—through public engagement, demonstrations, voting, 
or litigating government inaction in cases and controversies 
protecting the environment. To this end, as argued here, it 
proposes an additional manifestation of individual subjectiv-
ity, environmental aesthetics.
Legal scholars, such as Frank Grad, have already con-
nected environmental law and aesthetics, when they pointed 
out the aesthetic damage in conservation litigation.
[P]ublic disregard for aesthetics is a primary flaw in 
the way we now manage environmental affairs. While 
we can presumably measure environmental decay in 
ecological or other technical terms, it is popularly and 
more obviously evident when things turn ugly; the 
aesthetic argument is nearly always the most basic cry 
against development, whether in terms of sight, sound, 
smell, or taste. … A government concerned about the 
welfare of its citizens would be prudent not to deny or 
disparage the sixth sense whereby men can assess the 
present or future condition of their environment (Grad 
1971, 1543–44).
Along similar lines, on December 28, 1973, signing The 
Endangered Species Act into law, former President Richard 
Nixon used the aesthetics of conservation as a standard of 
good governance. Ironically, in hindsight, nature was per-
ceived as his government’s standard of beauty. Preserving 
threatened wildlife, whether wolves, frogs, snails, or eagles, 
was Nixon’s way to make “America more beautiful” (Nixon 
1973, 1027). He stated:
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I have today signed S. 1983, the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973. At a time when Americans are more 
concerned than ever with conserving our natural 
resources, this legislation provides the Federal Gov-
ernment with needed authority to protect an irreplace-
able part of our national heritage—threatened wildlife. 
[…] I congratulate the 93d Congress for taking this 
important step toward protecting a heritage, which we 
hold in trust to countless future generations of our fel-
low citizens. Their lives will be richer, and America 
will be more beautiful in the years ahead, thanks to 
the measure that I have the pleasure of signing into law 
today. (emphasis added) Id.
Because ecological damage is harder to determine and 
always requires more knowledge and expertise to ascer-
tain, this paper argues for aesthetics to become a driving 
force behind environmentalism. Few can ever forget Justice 
Antonin Scalia acknowledging in 2006 during the oral argu-
ment in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007), one of the last wins 
for environmentalists requiring government action to protect 
clean air, proudly shouting his ecological ignorance while 
making our rule of law:
Troposphere, whatever.
I told you before I'm not a scientist. [Laughter].
That’s why I don’t want to have to deal with global 
warming, to tell you the truth.1
From this perspective of understanding human nature as 
more inclined to intellectual comfort and unchecked display 
of emotions, political outbursts, and some level of aesthetics, 
this paper calls for a more-encompassing environmentalism. 
Usually, engaged citizenship builds on ideological inclina-
tions, where ideology is political subjectivity, individual 
subjectivity displayed in the public sphere (Neacşu 2020). 
Additionally, I suggest it theoretically frames environmen-
tally engaged citizenship through a mindful reliance on aes-
thetics. As Santayana suggested, good governance can take 
different forms at different times in different circumstances, 
and there is no reason why environmental conservation 
today should not suit a Republican as well as a Democratic 
administration, as it did last century. It is all a matter of har-
monizing conflicting interests, Santayana would say.
Theorizing about beauty, from his assumed public posi-
tion of a spectator—Harvard University academic—San-
tayana rejoiced exploring the conceptually multifaceted 
beauty (1896). As Willard Arnett (1989) reminds us, San-
tayana might have perceived beauty as objectified pleas-
ure, and aesthetics as the gift of finding immediate joy in 
the obvious. However, Santayana viewed it not separated, 
but interconnected with morals, as the only way to achieve 
harmony. “Every artist is a moralist, though he need not 
preach.” (1922, 158). Beauty existed for Santayana as a 
“good,” moral value. It incorporated both good governments 
and nature in its transcendent unifying ability to harmonize 
opposing interests.
My call relies on Santayana’s work because his theoreti-
cal matrix adds a new analytical perspective to the complex 
nature of environmentally engaged citizenship. It illuminates 
the ambivalence surrounding it, by exposing ugliness, such 
as redundancy, or outright fraudulent governing. This hap-
pens when in a democracy, the government does not govern 
in the name of, and for the people, but for certain people. It 
happened during the last few administrations overtly, though 
with different degrees of transparency, and while relying on 
different views of aesthetics.
The theoretical framing proposed here will help expose 
fallacies in judiciary reasoning, which contently cling onto 
procedural technicalities, a type of formal beauty, at the 
expense of substantive, redistributive, justice, as required 
by specific temporary contingencies (Neacşu 2020). To this 
aim, I will propose an aesthetic and ideological reading of 
the trial and appellate decisions in Juliana v. United States 
(2016, 2020). As discussed below, this case represents one 
of the major environmental losses for environmentalists 
seeking governmental action to protect and conserve nature. 
Ideologically, the plaintiffs argued for sustainable capitalism 
(Ghista 2004). Aesthetically, they argued for a particular 
type of beauty, one that preserved life on the planet. Legally, 
they asked the government to act responsibly and assert 
itself as agent of redistributive justice. Eventually, they lost 
on each front, maybe, as I propose here, because their argu-
ment was too foreign and unorthodox, or aesthetically speak-
ing, procedurally too novel, and substantively too abstract.
Environmentalism—the manifestation 
of aesthetic ideology
Paraphrasing Santayana (1922a, b), when the governed and 
governments visualize nature as beautiful and its conser-
vation as good, nature is preserved. When the governors 
practice good governance, the rise of the oceans can slow 
down so our planet can begin to heal. I argue that for this to 
happen, aesthetics need to overcome ideological differences.
Environmentally engaged citizenship reflects environ-
mental ideals, a mixture of various scientific, political, his-
toric, and aesthetic and philosophic theories, molded prag-
matically through private and public subjectivity up to the 
point of purposeful engagement. Climate change activism 
is one facet of its manifestation. Its engagement with power 
aims to conserve and thus perpetuate the human epoch, the 
1 United States Supreme Court (November 29, 2006). Massachusetts 
v. Environmental Protection Agency. Oral Argument https:// www. 
oyez. org/cases/2006/05–1120.
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Anthropocene (Baichwal 2019). Its complex nature requires 
a broad, interdisciplinary analysis because it brings people 
together, or it could unite them, at all levels of power, even 
when ideologically their views diverge.
The aesthetic symbolism of environmentalism—
Earth Day
While the Earth was healing itself under the reign of the 
COVID-19 pandemic (Dutta et  al. 2020), on April 22, 
202022, environmentalists celebrated 50 years since the first 
Earth Day. Unexpectedly, all they could do was to commem-
orate its history and its visual magnificence:
In 1970 some 20 million people across the United 
States, from thousands of schools, colleges, univer-
sities and communities, took part in demonstrations,
The New York Times’ John Schwartz (2020) credited the 
power of activism as the fire that sparked the political change 
at the core of the first Earth Day. Or as Denis Hayes, a gradu-
ate student at Harvard in 1969, and the chairman of the First 
Earth Day better explained how it all started, “the problem 
[has never been] technological; the problem [was and is] a 
matter of values.” Values, another word for ideals, often are 
ideologically and aesthetically induced.
More specific, Ralph Nader, a well-known environmen-
talist, credits Nixon’s ecological awareness for the triumph 
of the First Earth Day. Indeed, Richard Nixon did sign into 
laws major pieces of environmental legislation. Moreover, 
the Nixon administration did create the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the EPA—while, another Republican Presi-
dent, George H. W. Bush was the last president to sign any 
environmental bill into federal law.3 These environmental 
statutes allow citizens to sue the government for ecological 
or aesthetic harms (Cassuto 2004, 90).
Whatever made this unity of ideals between the gov-
erned and the governors last century remains commend-
able. Somehow, the ideal of a clean environment mirrored a 
private subjectivity many felt comfortable to reveal publicly, 
whether governors or governed. Using Santayana’s view of 
beauty in government as good government for most, then 
both Nixon and Bush shared an aesthetic that was pleasing 
to the governed as well. As shown below, aesthetics seems to 
be an important constitutive element in politics, as the brief 
survey or the Obama and Trump years shows, further sup-
porting the aesthetic ideology paradigm this paper proposes.
Political aesthetics and the Obama years
President Obama’s views of governance might be said are a 
textbook case of Santayana’s view of “beauty in the whole”: 
all creatures are instrumental to one another and their “inter-
relation is no injury to any part and an added beauty to the 
whole” (1905, 215). Though a broken promise, in a Presi-
dent Obama once aimed to have every health care and health 
insurance interest heard at his negotiating table—suggesting 
his view of beautiful government was closer to Santayana’s.
To achieve health care reform, “I’m going to have all 
the negotiations around a big table. We’ll have doc-
tors and nurses and hospital administrators. Insurance 
companies, drug companies – they’ll get a seat at the 
table, they just won’t be able to buy every chair. But 
what we will do is, we’ll have the negotiations tel-
evised on C-SPAN, so that people can see who is mak-
ing arguments on behalf of their constituents, and who 
are making arguments on behalf of the drug companies 
or the insurance companies. And so, that approach, I 
think is what is going to allow people to stay involved 
in this process.”4
In the same vein, it can be said that in 2008, environ-
mentalism received a much-needed shot of aesthetics ster-
oids, with a young politician’s call to imagine. That call, by 
Presidential Candidate, Barack Obama, produced a level of 
dream and information in our citizenry that action became 
inevitable.
2 Even the 50th anniversary of Earth Day, which took place online—
https:// www. earth day. org/ earth- day-2020/—had an aesthetic com-
mand. Its activism called for grandeur:
 Let’s flood the digital landscape with action—Join the global con-
versations on April 22! (Id.).
 marches, environmental cleanups and even a mock trial of automo-
biles that ended in smashing a car with sledgehammers. New York 
City closed down parts of Fifth Avenue and 14th Street for its cel-
ebration (Schwartz 2020).
3 Bush took the lead with the other significant piece of domestic 
legislation he signed while in office: the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990. […] Bush also showed his support for the environment by 
appointing the first professional environmentalist to lead the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) when he chose William Reilly as 
its head in 1989. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 built on 
the first bill passed in 1963 and subsequent bills in 1970 and 1977. 
The 1990 amendments focused on three aspects of clean air: reduc-
ing urban smog, curbing acid rain, and eliminating industrial emis-
sions of toxic chemicals. Although critics were concerned about the 
cost of the act and its effect on an already weakened economy, Presi-
dent Bush was deeply committed to environmental issues and claimed 
that by working with the business community to find innovative ways 
to improve the environment, the economy and the American people 
4 Politifact. https:// www. polit ifact. com/ truth-o- meter/ promi ses/ 
obame ter/ promi se/ 517/ health- care- reform- public- sessions-C-SPAN/
could both benefit. Congress passed the bill with significant support, 
and on November 15, 1990, President Bush signed the act.
 Knott, S. (2019) George H. W. Bush: Domestic affairs. https:// mille 
rcent er. org/ presi dent/ bush/ domes tic- affai rs.
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The journey will be difficult. The road will be long. I 
face this challenge with profound humility, and knowl-
edge of my own limitations. But I also face it with 
limitless faith in the capacity of the American people. 
Because if we are willing to work for it, and fight for 
it, and believe in it, then I am absolutely certain that 
generations from now, we will be able to look back 
and tell our children that this was the moment when 
we began to provide care for the sick and good jobs to 
the jobless; this was the moment when the rise of the 
oceans began to slow and our planet began to heal 
(emphasis added) (Obama 2008).
Obama’s speech energized voters. Eventually, voters 
trusted him and identified with him their ecojustice ideal. 
Or, vice versa.
In retrospect, that might have happened for reasons other 
than progressive values. Ideology in the restrictive meaning 
of ideatic manipulation (Neacşu 2020) might have been its 
premise, but it does not explain the success of Presidential 
Candidate Obama. Similarly, ideology as political interpel-
lation of the subject cannot alone explain the success of the 
candidate and then the popularity of President Obama whose 
environmental record remained far from top rated.
“President Obama will be remembered for strong lead-
ership on climate change. He implemented two key 
policies in the United States that will substantially cut 
the emissions of heat trapping gases — fuel economy 
standards for vehicles, and limits on carbon dioxide 
emissions from power plants. He also brokered a deal 
with China to cut emissions from that country, which 
is critical to the success of a worldwide agreement 
expected to emerge in Paris this year. The missing 
piece of his legacy is national climate change legisla-
tion, which he and congress failed to pass.”
— Kenneth Kimmell, president of the Union of Con-
cerned Scientists, a nonprofit.5
Candidate Obama’s success in sharing his ecological ide-
als is undeniable and it deserves considerable investigation. 
Santayana’s theorizing about the role of aesthetics in politics 
seems especially useful because, to a certain extent, it can 
be used to explain both the popularity of President Obama 
as well as the election of President Trump and Trumpism 
itself. In The Sense of Beauty, Santayana suggested that the 
essential right of democracy “is something purely aesthetic” 
(1896, 85). Explaining how our decisions are not necessarily 
based on knowledge, or even morality (Id., 84), Santayana 
then intimated that we choose our governments based on 
our aesthetics.
Democracy, prized at first as a means to happiness and 
as an instrument of good government, was acquiring 
an intrinsic value; it was beginning to seem good in 
itself, in fact, the only intrinsically right and perfect 
arrangement (Id.,85).
History proved his intuition right. Our democracy has not 
changed from one administration to the other based on aspi-
rations of a freer or a more moral government organization, 
as it happened during the French Revolution, for instance. 
Obama the candidate was the image of youth and virility, 
but also wisdom and fatherhood. More likely, the governed 
opted for that aesthetics to fit their multiplicity. That unify-
ing ground eased in the Democratic Obama administration.
Aesthetics apparently create and outlive political ideals. 
For instance, while the Obama Administration did not share 
the ideal of a stable climate of Candidate Obama for a long 
time, it did project its aesthetic by inhabiting and exuding 
tolerance and togetherness, prerequisite of natural conser-
vation. The young Democratic administration came around 
and shared the ideal of climate stability only in the latter 
part of its second term, and only in a very limited manner. 
“The Obama presidency would not always meet my early 
expectations,” a scholar reminisces (Kramer), “and on the 
critical issue of climate change the president often hedged 
and settled for half- measures” (Kramer 2020, 126).
In the end, for reasons both beyond and under his 
control, he did not do enough to “slow the rise of the 
oceans” as he promised that night in St. Paul. Yet, after 
some early stumbles on the issue, he did develop a cli-
mate action plan and create some important policies to 
try to mitigate carbon emissions. More than any of his 
predecessors, he seriously addressed the problem of 
global warming and in his last year in office committed 
the United States to the historic Paris Agreement—a 
flawed but solid climate policy legacy. But rather than 
building on these positive steps, his successor, in one 
of the greatest climate crimes in history, would attempt 
instead to roll back these accomplishments and demol-
ish any progress that had been made in responding to 
the climate crisis (Id.).
There were no environmentally focused legislative acts 
under either of the Obama administrations. Indeed, during 
his second administration with a Congress opposed to any 
environmental regulation, it would have taken much more 
than political allyship between Democrats and Republicans 
to have them passed. That is perhaps why only late within 
his second administration did something happen: The State 
Department signed the Paris Climate agreement (April 22, 
2016).
5 Peak, C. (2015) Here’s What 15 Experts Think of President Oba-
ma’s Record on the Environment. NationSwell https:// natio nswell. 
com/ 15- exper ts- obamas- envir onmen tal- legacy/.
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Although the government did not fulfill the demands of 
the governed, the Obama administration appeared as envi-
ronmentally good. If it had not inculcated, it clearly tolerated 
environmentally aesthetics as a value, as Santayana would 
have explained. The ideal of beauty, ergo, good govern-
ance, President Obama projected, even as climate litigation 
flooded the judiciary, survived. The first black administra-
tion in the history of the USA surrounded itself if not by 
tolerance and goodwill, certainly by a new aesthetic: I would 
argue that black was becoming beautiful, and environmen-
talism popular. For instance, environmental hope expanded 
encompassing the belief that the judiciary might find the 
federal government liable for mismanaging the “res publica” 
the commons. Juliana v. United States, the case discussed in 
this paper, was filed in 2015.
Political aesthetics and the Trump years
Juliana v. United States was decided in the lower court, in 
November 2016, while the country was riding the tail end of 
the Obama’s matrix of harmony. United States District Judge 
Ann Aiken, exercising her “reasoned judgment” in Juliana 
(2016), applied that particular set of political and juridical 
aesthetics—she had no doubt that “the right to a climate 
system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental to a 
free and ordered society.”6
As a new administration was taking over the reign of 
the country, and of governmental aesthetics, it became 
clear that Obama’s ecojustice captured an ideal of abstract 
beauty, which favored preserving nature as necessary for the 
survival of future generations. To the contrary, Trumpian-
ism was developing its own version of beauty. Its attrac-
tion was built on its rarefied, unreachable nature. Trump 
called climate change and the fight to stabilize it for the 
sake of a bluer sky tomorrow a “hoax” (Turner 2018). He 
denied its existence, partly because he could promote a new 
standard of beauty with mediated access to his private golf 
courses, manicured to look greener than the wilderness of 
the destroyed and abandoned commons.
With Trump, our national imaginary discovered that 
“regal and priestly grandeur” do impress the governed, 
as Santayana acknowledged in Persons and Places (1944, 
164–65). Trump rode formal, acquired, manicured beauty, 
and pomp more than Republican ideology on his successful 
ascent to power.
Using different political aesthetics, President Trump, a 
sort of Melania’s Plastic Camelot, brought in an antitheti-
cal set of beauty standards (Flanagan 2020). First, Obama’s 
racially inclusive government was being replaced by a 
racially indifferent government of such aesthetic values as 
“catching a glimpse of something different” (Arnett 1955, 
190). While Obama’s political discourse was cogent in its 
imaginary—remember the call to heal the planet—Trumpi-
anism reveled in what Frankfurt identified as “bullshit” 
(2005), or “truthiness” (Caron 2021). Nevertheless, both 
narratives were equally easy to visualize. To Obama’s mul-
tilayered aesthetics: rarified in their intellectualism but com-
forting in their maternal projection—Michelle’s bare arms 
were a call for fit mothers from all walks of lives, Trumpian 
beauty offered the Plastic Camelot (Flanagan 2020). Equally 
feminine, it remains antithetic to Obama’s. Trumpian beauty 
relies on emaciated models turned First Lady and First 
Daughter, and on a disparaging discourse of rejection of 
those who do not fit that particular mold (Shear and Sul-
livan 2018).
Sanatayana’s work clarified the role of aesthetics in gov-
ernment. It also makes it easier to understand how the era 
of Trumpism was able to so successfully replace the Obama 
mindset for a large segment of the population. In fact, many 
Obama and Trump supporters shared similar values: they 
were more aesthetic than ideological. Obama played the 
aesthetic subjectivity card, and the governed embraced it 
relieved. Trumpism, the Obama anti-aesthetics, played its 
looks to its grotesque end. On January 6, 2021, the Roman 
centurion-wannabees (the image of the fighter) covered in 
the American tricolor failed in their attempt to silence gov-
ernance by any other name but Trump (Fuchs 2021, 250).
Environmentalism cannot be conceived outside the realm 
of politics. The recent administrations relied heavily on 
aesthetics as a value to inspire their supporters. As shown 
below, until recently, environmentalism had a jurisprudential 
facet: environmental justice was fought in courts. While such 
a strategy may not be wise with the current Supreme Court, I 
use Juliana as a case study to show that if “good citizenship” 
imagines taking the litigation path, then judicial aesthetics 
need to be considered as much as the ideological contin-
gency of that future moment. Here, judicial aesthetics cover 
the substantive theory the plaintiffs used to build their case.
Juliana v. United States—epitome 
of environmentalism and aesthetic ideology
Juliana, presented as a search for the ideal of ecojustice, 
captured the imagination of many primarily because of its 
aesthetics, the youth of its plaintiffs, often referred to as 
the “children.” Juliana (how befitting) is the nickname of a 
federal lawsuit whose plaintiffs, twenty-one young citizens, 
from across the USA, with the support of the non-profit Our 
Children’s Trust and Earth Guardians, an environmental 
organization, filed a constitutional climate change lawsuit 
against the federal government, on August 12, 2015.6 https:// www. ourch ildre nstru st. org/ julia na-v- us.
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The suit was filed against the Obama administration, 
the President, the USA, and federal agencies (collectively, 
“the government”), which had been replaced by the Trump 
administration. Aesthetically, the plaintiffs represented the 
abandoned youth, while the defendants the rapacious, older 
generation, having failed to do its duty to protect a segment 
of its citizenry: its youth.
What was the scope of the lawsuit?
As seen in their filings,7 the Juliana plaintiffs alleged a mul-
titude of claims, among them that the federal government’s 
promotion of and support for fossil fuel development vio-
lated their Fifth Amendment due process right to a “cli-
mate system capable of sustaining human life.” This claim 
requested a declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs also alleged that the federal government had an 
obligation, as a trustee, to protect public trust resources from 
despoliation.8 Under the atmospheric trust doctrine, the air 
and atmosphere, like other natural resources, were presented 
“within the res of the public trust”; with the United States 
government, their public trustee charged with managing the 
resources placed in trust for present and future generations. 
In its role of trustee, plaintiff asserted that the government 
owed them a fiduciary duty to prevent waste, including “sub-
stantial impairment” of the trust resources, while the courts 
had a duty to enforce the trust obligations. The relief for 
this clam was injunctive relief—stopping greenhouse gas 
emissions whose carbon dioxide, produced by burning fossil 
fuels, were destabilizing the climate system.
Defendants and interveners (industry associations allowed 
by Magistrate Judge Coffin)9 moved to have the complaint 
dismissed asserting that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring 
this suit, raised non-justiciable political questions, and they 
failed to state a constitutional claim. In addition, the movants 
asserted that the public trust doctrine did not provide a cog-
nizable federal cause of action.
The District Court judge accepted jurisdiction giving 
plaintiffs the green light to prepare for trial. It denied the 
government’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plain-
tiffs had standing to sue, raised justiciable (rather than politi-
cal) questions, and stated a claim for infringement of a Fifth 
Amendment due process right to a “climate system capable 
of sustaining human life” (Aiken, 3–4, 2016).
The court defined that right to be free from catastrophic 
climate change, and catastrophic climate change as causing 
“human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in wide-
spread damage to property, threaten human food sources, 
and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem” (Id.). The 
District Court found that the plaintiffs had stated a viable 
“danger-creation due process claim” arising from the gov-
ernment’s failure to regulate third-party emissions.
This is no ordinary lawsuit … This lawsuit chal-
lenges decisions defendants have made across a vast 
set of topics – decisions like whether and to what 
extent to regulate  CO2 emissions from power plants 
and vehicles, whether to permit fossil fuel extraction 
and development to take place on federal lands, how 
much to charge for use of those lands, whether to 
give tax breaks to the fossil fuel industry, whether to 
subsidize or directly fund that industry, whether to 
fund the construction of fossil fuel infrastructure such 
as natural gas pipelines at home and abroad, whether 
to permit the export and import of fossil fuels from 
and to the United States, and whether to authorize 
new marine coal terminal projects. Plaintiffs assert 
defendants’ decisions on these topics have substan-
tially caused the planet to warm and the oceans to 
rise. They draw a direct causal link between defend-
ants’ policy choices and floods, food shortages, 
destruction of property, species extinction, and a host 
of other harms (Id.)
What made Juliana “no ordinary suit?”
From the angle of the aesthetics analysis, in Juliana, the 
plaintiffs’ “environmental imagination” met Judge Aiken’s. 
Formally, this was no ordinary lawsuit (Blumm & Wood 
2017) because of its dual relief: declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, based on defendants’ obligation to hold natural 
resources in public trust. Jedediah Purdy explained environ-
mental imagination as the legal cloak that warps and binds 
together the “material stuff of land and resources” and the 
“imaginative devices of religion, aesthetics and rhetoric”:
This is not to say, of course, that law is an idealistic 
enterprise in any straightforward way. Frequently, what 
law translates is the strength of material interests: the 
engines of change are land speculators, miners, ranch-
ers, railroads, elite tourists, suburban voters panicked 
by a poisoning scare. But even those interests are made 
partly out of ideals: the dignity of the rancher, the sub-
lime experience of the tourist, the ecological picture of 
nature that helps the suburbanite see a tie between the 
soil in her backyard and the industrial regulation of the 
Clean Air Act. Interests are formed by interpretation 
as much as by brute fact, and so they are shot through 
7 Available at http:// clima tecas echart. com/ case/ julia na-v- united- state 
s/? cn- reloaded = 1.
8 For more on public trust, see, e.g., Mary Christina Wood’s theoreti-
cal work, see The Power of the Public Trust Doctrine (2017) https:// 
thegr eenin tervi ew. com/ inter view/ wood- mary- chris tina/
9 https:// www. supre mecou rt. gov/ Docke tPDF/ 18/ 18A65/ 54512/ 20180 
71714 50194 12_ 17A% 20US% 20v% 20US% 20 Dist%20Ct%20%20
-%20Stay%20Appl%20App.pdf.
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with ideals. Environmental imagination has always 
been a blend of the two (Purdy 2015, 229).
Judge Aiken’s decision was not an “idealistic enter-
prise,” just because it was beautiful, good, morally, and 
legally sound, as Santayana would have defined its beauty. 
Furthermore, Judge Aiken analyzed the children’s lawsuit 
according to the recent United States Supreme Court stare 
decisis, the Obergefell (2015) precedent. She viewed a par-
allel between the children’s claim to a fundamental liberty 
right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human 
life” and Obergefell’s reasoning. “Just as marriage is the 
‘foundation of the family,’ a stable climate system is quite 
literally the foundation ‘of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress” (Aiken, in Juli-
ana v. U.S., 2016, 31). In other words, the children’s claim 
that “a stable climate is a necessary condition to exercising 
other rights to life, liberty, and property” was consistent 
with Obergefell’s reasoning, it fits within its legal reason-
ing. Furthermore, Judge Aiken ignored the defendants’ 
position that the public trust doctrine did not provide a 
cognizable federal cause of action. Its element of novelty 
or heterogeneity did not destabilize her view of the rule of 
law: organizing a living society for the future.
When Judge Aiken rejected the contention that she was 
deciding beyond a court’s competence, “making ad hoc pol-
icy determinations about how to weigh competing economic 
and environmental concerns” (Aiken, 2016, 12), she did not 
expand the immediate role of the judiciary beyond directing 
any individual agency to issue or enforce a particular regula-
tion. She manifested the proper role of our courts. With the 
help of scientists, it is the role of the court to be the fact.
finder, and to “determine what emissions level would be 
sufficient to redress [plaintiffs’] injuries” (Id., at 18). And 
once the facts would be established, the Court could declare 
the United States’ current environmental policy infringe their 
fundamental rights, and subsequently direct the agencies to 
do their job properly. In Juliana, that meant to conduct a 
consumption-based inventor of United States  CO2 emissions, 
and use that inventory to “prepare and implement an enforce-
able national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions 
and draw down excess atmospheric  CO2 so as to stabilize 
the climate system and protect the vital resources on which 
Plaintiffs now and in the future will depend” (Id., 12–13).
Ephemeral beauty
For two years, the Trump Administration pursued, pro-
tracted, and convoluted litigation in the Ninth Circuit and 
Supreme Court to dismiss the case or to obtain an interlocu-
tory appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Not until both the Ninth 
Circuit and Supreme Court suggested that an interlocutory 
appeal was appropriate, Judge Aiken reluctantly agreed to 
allow an interlocutory appeal in the Ninth Circuit.
It is hard to summarize how vigorously the Trump 
Department of Justice (DOJ) fought discovery of its 
energy policy decision related to fossil fuels for the past 
fifty years.
Briefly, first, DOJ filed a request for interlocutory appeal, 
a very unusual step as appeals take place after a decision 
on the merits happens, which Judge Aiken did not issue. A 
day after, she denied the United States Government’s initial 
request for an interlocutory appeal; the DOJ filed a Ninth 
Circuit Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and a Request to 
Stay the proceedings.
The Ninth Circuit denied the DOJ’s Petition for a Writ of 
Mandamus without prejudice: it held that the petition was 
premature because the Government had failed to demon-
strate the “extraordinary circumstances” required for man-
damus relief when a party asks an appellate court to review 
a case before the trial court proceedings have concluded. 
Though the Ninth Circuit denied the petition, it also sug-
gested that the District Court should consider narrowing 
the claims before going to trial. The Court of Appeals was 
“mindful that some of the plaintiffs’ claims as currently 
pleaded [were] quite broad, and some of the remedies the 
plaintiffs seek may not be available as redress.”
Perhaps emboldened by the language in the dismissal, 
DOJ filed a motion in the United States Supreme Court seek-
ing to stay discovery and halt the trial. The Supreme Court 
denied the Government’s motion without prejudice, but cau-
tioned the District Court that the breadth of respondents’ 
claims is striking, and their justiciability presented substan-
tial grounds for difference of opinion.
Undaunted by this new dismissal, and perhaps embold-
ened by its language, next, DOJ filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Mandamus in the Supreme Court, which was again denied 
without prejudice. The Court though repeated its previous 
observation regarding the “‘striking’ breath” of the plain-
tiffs’ claims, and noted, “the Government’s petition for a 
writ of mandamus does not have a ‘fair prospect’ of success 
in this Court because adequate relief may be available in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.”
In light of the Supreme Court language, the Ninth Circuit 
granted the Government’s renewed Motion for a Temporary 
Stay of the District Court, delaying the then-scheduled trial 
before Judge Aiken’s court in Eugene, OR. Furthermore, 
citing both Supreme Court’s orders in the case, it requested 
the District Court to revisit its decisions.
Thus pressured, on November 21, 2018, Judge Aiken 
finally capitulated. “This Court stands by its prior rulings 
on jurisdictional and merits issues, as well as its belief that 
this case would be better served by further factual develop-
ment at trial.” Nevertheless, she felt compelled by the Ninth 
Circuit’s November 8th order and the Supreme Court’s July 
 Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences
1 3
30th and November 2nd orders in the case to certify the case 
for interlocutory appeal.
The Ninth Circuit’s stance
On December 26, 2018, the Ninth Circuit, in a divided two 
to one panel decision, granted the Government permission to 
take an interlocutory appeal. Chief Judge Thomas and Judge 
Berzon were in the majority. Judge Friedland filed a dissent-
ing opinion because she read Judge Aiken’s order author-
izing an interlocutory appeal as actually arguing that such 
an appeal was inappropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and 
that the District Court had only granted the order certifying 
an interlocutory appeal under compulsion from statements in 
orders by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. Accord-
ingly, Judge Friedland would have allowed the case to pro-
ceed to trial in the District Court (Mank, 288–92, 2020).
The Ninth Circuit’s decision did not address the merits of 
the case either. To the vigorous fight put up by the government, 
the Ninth Circuit refused to rule on the constitutional right to a 
stable climate. As scholars have noted, it only found that plain-
tiffs had not defendable right to hold the government account-
able to come up with a climate change action plan (Craig, 54, 
2020). The Ninth Circuit found that the government owed no 
duty to its citizens to protect their health and welfare from the 
harm caused because knowingly it approved and promoted the 
use of fossil fuels, the principal cause of climate disturbance. 
Aesthetically speaking, the Ninth Circuit did not “see” the chil-
dren’s alleged right, and neither could “see” it infringed, so it 
refused them their due process of law.
Clearly, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s 
holding in Juliana. While the District Court found the gen-
eral factual allegation sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss, the Ninth Circuit disagreed (Juliana, 2020). First, 
it remained unimpressed with the children’s demand for a 
fundamental right to life for all, including themselves. For 
instance, Judge Aiken cited U.S. v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), for 
the proposition that standing could not to be denied simply 
because many people suffered the same injury, but in differ-
ent degrees. She held that climatic deterioration would affect 
more the youth, and their fundamental right to life.
While the FAC identifies numerous climatic, mete-
orological, and political harms that the Earth and 
its inhabitants will suffer as a result of the govern-
ment’s action and failure to act with respect to CO2 
emissions, the plaintiffs differentiate the impacts by 
alleging greater harm to youth and future generations 
(Juliana, 2016, 1268).
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The Appellate Court found 
the violation of the youth’s expectation “merely speculative” 
(Juliana, 2020, 21).
Where plaintiffs alleged because carbon dioxide  (CO2) 
persisted in the atmosphere, future emissions would lead to 
severe impacts on children and future generations and the 
current level of  CO2 had already taken our country into the 
“danger zone”; District Judge Aiken agreed that their inter-
est in the regulation of  CO2 level was sufficiently concrete, 
and counted as an “injury in fact” (2016). To the contrary, 
the Ninth Circuit held that even if some injuries were con-
crete (water scarcity had forced some plaintiffs to relocate), a 
simple declaration that the USA is violating the Constitution 
would do almost nothing to redress the plaintiffs’ concrete 
injuries (Juliana, 2020, 22).
What for a moment became a rare case of agreeing to go 
beyond the accepted and expected rules of procedure, or 
using our aesthetic vocabulary, to see the aesthetic argument 
beyond the ordinary, proved to be ephemeral. Some would 
say that the Ninth Circuit had no other option that based on 
stare decisis, it had its hands tied up. It seems disingenuous. 
While there was little Supreme Court precedent one way or 
the other on the exact issues that the Ninth Circuit was con-
fronting in Juliana, there was sufficient stare decisis that the 
Oregon lower court and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth 
Circuit cited different Supreme Court precedent in support 
for their findings.
Both decisions had been overanalyzed. Judge Aiken’s 
decision was hailed as having created history. Climate activ-
ists (Lohse 2017) had called the lawsuit “the most important 
lawsuit on the  planet” (Id.), perhaps because it “sought no 
monetary damages, just solutions, and to hold accountable 
those who knowingly violated future generations’ rights to 
life, liberty, and property” (Id.).
Its coverage, by a number of major American periodicals, 
was deeply ideological; the name of the periodical was suf-
ficient to indicate whether the coverage was positive or not. 
For instance, the National Review’s article was rhetorically 
entitled: Groundbreaking Means Insane? (Whalen 2016).
Scholarly dissertations (Ortiz 2017) had been or were in 
the process of being written about it. The lawsuit’s public 
importance seemed only to have been heightened by the 
inauguration of a President who had vocally dismissed cli-
mate change as a “hoax” and taken steps to expand domestic 
fossil fuel production (Id.).
Thus, understandably, Juliana has been held as a deeply 
consequential lawsuit, and not only for its potential legal 
outcomes, about subjecting government inaction on climate 
change to strict scrutiny and compelling the executive branch 
to adopt a comprehensive climate action plan (Id.). But also, 
of equal importance, for many scholars was the expectation 
that Juliana could catalyze a broader transformation in the 
national imagination of climate change.
Some may say that the Ninth Circuit had very little 
choice, because a ruling for the plaintiffs would have been 
doomed in the Supreme Court because it lacked the 5–4 
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ideological majority to win. From this perspective, dismiss-
ing the lawsuit, the majority on the Ninth Circuit did as little 
damage as possible under the circumstances. This view is 
purely ideological. It ignores the possibility advanced here 
that environmental aesthetics harmonize ideologies. Using 
Santayana’s aesthetic theory, good governance would require 
the judiciary to address the nefarious effects of governmental 
inaction on our climate, on our commons, and incorporate 
Wood’s theory of res publica, as applied to the environment 
(Blumm & Woods 2017).
Aesthetically speaking, the judiciary would need to 
choose theories that are novels (Wood’s) and potentially 
welcome jurisprudential challenges. The two Ninth Cir-
cuit judges10 who wrote the majority opinion reversing and 
remanding the District Court’s found that the legal argument 
in Juliana challenged their views on standing and environ-
mental damage beyond the ordinary. Such an explanation 
seems right, if we were to use Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497 (2007), as insight, despite the obvious differences 
between the two lawsuits.
First, in Massachusetts, petitioners were not children. The 
adult that started it all, Joe Mendelson, eventually found 
support from organizations, municipalities, and even some 
of the Union’s states as right holders. That was essential, 
because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on standing is 
more generous with states’ rights. Second, the allegations 
in Massachusetts were statutory and regulatory and limited 
to the inaction of one particular governmental agency, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Massachu-
setts petitioners alleged the agency’s illegal failure to regu-
late the emissions of four gases, including carbon dioxide, 
under §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, and the subsequent 
EPA petition denial, on grounds that it was not authorized 
to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate 
change, and even if it had the authority to set greenhouse 
gas emission standards, it would have been unwise to do 
because there was no unequivocally established causal link 
between greenhouse gases and the increase in global sur-
face air temperatures. Their suit was less audacious than 
the EPA’s refusal to act, but not unimaginable from a legal 
point of view.
In light of the fact that in Massachusetts, the petitioners 
did not use any new and novel legal arguments: they hid 
behind a sovereign state’s interest in its coastal land; it begs 
the question whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision (2020) was 
a defensive response to the bright legal imagination of the 
children’s lawsuit (Pace 2019). Under the Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation strategy, “the children in Juliana claimed that 
their fundamental right must be secured and protected by 
the federal government pursuant to public trust obligations” 
(Id., at 85). Maybe the Juliana plaintiffs played too large 
a hand when they asked the courts to consider the planet 
and its climate res publica, and the government acting as a 
trustee for them. By asking for redress of a violation of an 
inchoate fundamental right to life on a planet with a livable 
climate, the Juliana plaintiffs perhaps introduced an easier 
possibility of rejection, of their otherwise unthreatening, 
aesthetically pleasing claim: “[to stop] the planet to warm 
and the oceans to rise” (Juliana 2016, 4). Maybe its exog-
enous nature proved more threatening to the legal system 
than Trumpism to the political system. But then, the judici-
ary needs to understand that environmental imagination is 
dynamic (Buell 1995), and it should adapt.
Certainly, ecojustice advocates may argue that like in any 
suit, the plaintiffs had no choice because they had to show 
standing: that they had an enforceable right, violated by the 
defendants’ action, and that the court could offer redress. 
Litigation politics will always carry the day. We will never 
know why it made sense to ask the courts for both a declara-
tory relief and to recognize a new fundamental right that 
“to a stable and healthy climate system, which the United 
States must actively address and protect via public trust 
obligations” (ourchildrenstrust.org/Juliana-v-us). A more 
cautious litigator would have advised the plaintiffs about a 
two-lawsuit approach. Then, in turn, that could be argued as 
being an aesthetic choice.
Legal aesthetics
The final outcome in Juliana proves that aesthetics, like 
environmental perception (Buell 1995), is dynamic. Moreo-
ver, I contend that it is constitutive of the law itself. Juliana 
might have pushed the ideal of environmental legal aesthetic, 
or better yet, of aesthetic ideology, but not in a winning 
manner.
Maybe litigation is too conservative, and has to conform 
to specific norms, to be the right avenue. In law, conformity 
is aesthetically pleasing. And only within these parameters 
can one talk about a procedural sense of beauty, as marked 
by Massachusetts v. EPA.
10 Only Trump appointed more than 150 judges, and.
 The 9th Circuit in particular, which Trump has railed against as a 
“big thorn in our side” in the past due to its liberal bent, has seen a 
dramatic change in its makeup over the past three years, with 10 of its 
29 active seats now being held by Trump appointees, and nearly half 
being held by appointees of Republican administrations.
 Blitzer, R. (Dec. 22, 2019) Trump heads into 2020 with ‘historic’ 
judicial appointments. Fox News https:// www. foxne ws. com/ polit ics/ 
trump- heads- into- 2020- with- histo ric- judic ial- appoi ntmen ts.
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Massachusetts was similar to all other environmental 
cases that had been decided since Kennedy had joined 
the Court two decades earlier. In all but one of those 
cases, Justice Kennedy had sided with the major-
ity. And in many of those instances, he had been the 
deciding fifth vote. At least in environmental law, but 
not only then, the way Kennedy went was the way of 
the Court. That is why some jokingly referred to the 
Supreme Court as the “Kennedy Court” rather than, as 
is traditionally done, by the name of the Chief Justice 
(Lazarus 2020, 183).
Equally interesting is that aesthetic ideologies are deter-
minant. In 2007, it was Justice Anthony Kennedy’s year, 
though it was Justice Antonin Scalia’s conservatism that had 
a stronger element of playfulness, even if limited to belittling 
or bullying what he perceived to be his ideatic opponents. 
In Massachusetts, for instance, during oral argument, the 
attorney arguing for the petitioners needed to carefully settle 
on the deceptive opening statement, whose 39 words had to 
assuage the Justices’ environmental imagination. As Lazarus 
mentions (2020), the mere mentioning of climate change as 
the object of the policy litigated would have totally derailed 
the argument:
If I may, I’d like to frame the merits very quickly and 
then turn immediately to standing. Although the case 
before you arises in an important policy area, it turns 
on ordinary principles of statutory interpretation and 
administrative law (Id. at 187- 88).
We will never know why the Ninth Circuit chose to 
reverse Judge Aiken’s decision. But it is a strong possibil-
ity, especially in light of our aesthetics analysis, that the 
Juliana plaintiffs’ call for judiciary action was too legally 
foreign and unorthodox, especially in light of the Trumpian 
success in changing the composition of our federal judici-
ary everywhere.11 Moreover, if Massachusetts is in any way 
indicative, the judiciary’s desire or ability to confront envi-
ronmental truth is indeed very limited.
For instance, in 2007, the US Supreme Court proved that 
it could only entertain truthiness in terms of relief.
We are not asking the Court to pass judgment on the 
science of climate change or to order EPA to set emis-
sion standards. We simply want EPA to visit the rule-
making petition based upon permissible considerations 
(Id. at 190).
To the EPA’s refusal to perform its duties under delegated 
authority, adding the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
refusal to direct the EPA to revisit a petition ignored seven 
years earlier sounds ineffectual, and definitely not close to 
good governance. Perhaps, the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence mirrored Justice Scalia, as the most vociferous Jus-
tice (Lazarus 2020), who could not, or simply refused to 
understand the science behind pollution, how carbon dioxide 
leaving the atmosphere and reaching the troposphere, not the 
stratosphere, contributed to global warming and by impli-
cation, to endangering public welfare. Thus, the Court was 
spared argument about the fact that a federal agency refused 
to do its job and regulate greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Court did not have to hear about greenhouse gas emissions 
endangering public health and welfare although, by statute, 
by the will of the People, the EPA was required to restrict 
greenhouse gas emissions.
To the many other distinctions between Massachusetts 
and Juliana, in Juliana, the plaintiffs did not seem to con-
sider the proven judiciary inability to grant regulatory relief. 
The Juliana plaintiffs wanted to change legal standards in 
environmental litigation. In retrospect, the Ninth Circuit 
ignored all that work (2020). It treated the lawsuit as a mere 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) violation: Did the 
enumerated agencies violate their duties within the limits 
imposed on them by the main enabling statute or not? The 
Ninth Circuit, after having refused a writ of mandamus, 
eventually went forward with an interlocutory appeal, and 
held that all defending agencies acted within their legal del-
egation of powers, and furthermore, the plaintiffs’ injury 
from the dissolution of the Republic had nothing specific, 
because it “would be felt by all citizens equally” (Juliana, 
2020).
As mentioned earlier, some believe that the Ninth Circuit 
knew that had it not reversed the lower court decision; the 
plaintiffs would have nevertheless lost, because now, there 
are three Justices in lieu of the infamous Antonin Scalia, and 
his loudly spoken words:
[Stratosphere], troposphere, whatever, I told you 
before I am not a scientist. That’s why I don’t want to 
have to deal with global warming, to tell you the truth. 
(Oral Argument, 200712).
12 https:// www. oyez. org/ cases/ 2006/ 05- 1120
11 In his first three years, Trump appointed more than 150 judges, 
and.
 The 9th Circuit in particular, which Trump has railed against as a 
“big thorn in our side” in the past due to its liberal bent, has seen a 
dramatic change in its makeup over the past three years, with 10 of its 
29 active seats now being held by Trump appointees, and nearly half 
being held by appointees of Republican administrations.
 Blitzer, R. (Dec. 22, 2019) Trump heads into 2020 with ‘historic’ 
judicial appointments. Fox News https:// www. foxne ws. com/ polit ics/ 
trump- heads- into- 2020- with- histo ric- judic ial- appoi ntmen ts.
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In the process, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the ability to 
fathom redress for such an undifferentiated harm. It lacked 
the legal imagination of the dissenter, who, while not 
offering any “metrics for judicial determination of the level 
of climate change that would cause ‘the willful dissolution 
of the Republic’,” (Juliana, 2020, 30) nevertheless could 
imagine the confluence of the technical damage with the 
aesthetic damage. The dissolution of the Republic assumes 
a tangible and intangible damage: one to the very existence 
of the subjects of the Republic, and one to the quality of 
those subjects, to what they consider democratic and worth 
fighting for and preserving. In the end, whether the Ninth 
Circuit chose the beauty of ending a particular journey, 
while choosing to protect its future possibility, or whether 
it chose the beauty of procedural standing over the foreign 
substantive of a claim for violations of a res publica on 
behalf of the youth of America, no one will know. But, 
what became clear is that Santayana’s matrix of unifying 
interests for the common good could be embraced by 
governance even in its judiciary aspect: while focused on 
controversies, the judiciary never has its hands tied, as 
Judge Aiken’s opinion showed.
Environmentally engaged citizenship
Aesthetic ideology
Through Santayana’s analysis of beauty, we might under-
stand how Juliana became an epitome of ecojustice, and also 
why it did not last: it satisfied the aesthetics of the governed 
but not of the governor; or worse, their ideals did not sup-
port each other. The plaintiffs represented an archetype of 
beauty: youth. Their claims sought another type of beauty, 
a type of climate, and a type of oceans, and atmosphere 
that would produce a type of blue sky. But how and when 
did Juliana turn from an ideal of beauty—seeking the Holy 
Grail of a type of climate—to its opposite, a discardable 
outcome, reversed, and remanded by the Ninth Circuit—in 
other words, we can only guess. But perhaps we can figure 
out using Santayana’s theory of beauty how to expand envi-
ronmental pleasure so it never stops being enjoyable by both 
rulers and ruled.
The blue sky may come to please chiefly because it 
seems the image of a serene conscience, or of the eter-
nal youth and purity of nature after a thousand partial 
corruptions,
Santayana explains how ideals work within our per-
ceptions (1896, 7). Such metaphors may carry us to the 
contemplation of nature, but the question is how to build 
an ideal of hope to engage our energies to build it. Sure, the 
outcome is what matters, and aesthetics could be arguably 
viewed as superior to science if they suffice to embolden 
action.
Juliana proves that at one point in the environmental jus-
tice movement in the USA, a stable climate became desir-
able (or not threatening) for a significant segment of the 
ruling class, and their many enablers, and it matched the 
American people’s politics and aesthetics. Paraphrasing Spi-
noza, as we desire nothing because it is good or beautiful, 
but it is good and beautiful because we desire it, then what 
is the key ingredient to inspire both environmental activism 
and political action?
Juliana also proves that the ideal of a stable climate 
eventually lost that edge of beauty for the governor, in this 
case the Ninth Circuit judges. Is there a way to stabilize 
that? Environmentalism will always represent progressive 
politics, but its ideology does not need to repel those only 
interested in the formal beauty of nature. While an indispen-
sable aspect of one’s subjectivity—their political subjectiv-
ity—ideology is deeply dynamic and influenced by private 
subjectivity, alienation, education, experiences, and one’s 
gender, race, or sexual orientation, and of course, emotions, 
and their sense of beauty.
The Circuit Court did not share the lower Court’s ideal of 
beauty “of a blue sky.” Worse, the Ninth Court did not see 
that the youth were being shortchanged by the older genera-
tion. That abrupt disdain for life on planet Earth was made 
possible by many reasons. Ideology could be chief among 
them.
Ideology, as a concept and as a theory about that concept, 
has a very political birthdate. Ideology was first defined as 
a science of ideas by Antoine Desttut de Tracy, an educated 
nobleman (a count) and a political revolutionary who 
supported the French Revolution of 1789. Interestingly, 
de Tracy (1817) identified it as a type of “specialized” 
knowledge (“true”) belonging to the rarefied sphere of 
intellectuals, or savants, to whom the 1795 Convention 
entrusted the management of the newly founded Institut de 
France.
Ironically, at its origins, ideology represented “true 
knowledge”; it aimed to discover the sources of what we 
know. Ideology belonged to the first level of knowledge, 
ontology, if we were to oppose it to other forms of special-
ized knowledge production, such as epistemology, knowl-
edge about knowledge.
Decades later, Marx also studied ideology, and many 
of us use the concept loosely based on Marx’s views. 
His position on this topic vacillated, and Marxists often 
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misinterpreted it.13 Whatever the view, since Marx, ideology 
has become better defined. It reflected the subject’s political 
values, which set it apart from other systems of belief, such 
as religion or ethics.
In German Ideology (1846), Marx addressed ideology 
in a multifaceted way, referring to it epistemologically, in 
the vein of Destutt de Tracy (1817), but also prefiguring 
Clifford Geertz’s vocabulary (1973), as a political (rather 
than cultural) add-on determined by the material intercourse 
of men. But when Marx became too ludic and posited the 
qualifier “camera obscura”,14 Marxian epigones and detrac-
tors limited ideology to an optical illusion, as a political 
distortion of truth. Be it the ultimate meaning of Marxian 
ideology, one could still argue, as I do, that ideology could 
have one function individually and a different one socially. 
Additionally, Marx is a pragmatic theoretician, and rather 
than discuss ideology conceptually, he focused on its mani-
festation. While reaching a different position than Marx, I 
believe that this is the most telling way to understand his 
views on ideology.
Some agreed that for Marx, ideology expresses the individ-
ual’s idea about their position vis-à-vis others within the mar-
ketplace. Jon Elster developed (1985) this Marxian angle when 
he contended that ideology is a reflection on human alienation, 
whether material or intellectual. I agree with Elster’s take that 
ideology reflects on the individual’s alienation within the soci-
etal web of power. But ideology is formative at a different level 
than alienation (Neacşu 2020). It interpolates individuals and 
it actualizes them into political subjects.
Ideology as political subjectivity bolsters environmen-
tal activism. It brings the aesthetic ideal of a stable climate 
into the political arena: politicians implant ideals into our 
political imaginations and people become politically mobi-
lized. We vote for a president or a political representative in 
agreement with their views: ideologically, or we do not act 
against them because of their other values, including those 
ethical, or aesthetical. Environmental aesthetics might be a 
barometer of the ideological inclination of an entire nation, 
and perhaps a lens to understand what citizens are willing 
to delegate to political representatives or even to govern-
ment bureaucracies, and what they are willing to engage 
with themselves. But, within environmentalism, aesthetics 
and ideology work hand in hand, and perhaps where action 
is needed one aspect can pull the other to achieve the much-
needed goal: climate action.
Engaged citizenship
Historically, the development of the institution of citizenship 
started in the public sphere with the dissemination of writings 
13 Marx’s position on ideology has been widely misinterpreted 
(Barrett 1991). John Torrance (1995) put together an illustrative list 
of thirteen prominent propositions about ideology that have been 
wrongly attributed to Marx, indicating to whom each view should be 
credited:
 1. Ideology is a psychological process, not a theoretical prod-
uct (Engels).
 2. Ideology is an effect of false consciousness, i.e. ignorance 
of the real class motives that determine personal motivation 
(Engels).
 3. Ideology is the “top tier” in a model of historical deter-
mination of superstructures by the economic base; or alterna-
tively, the entire superstructure is “ideological,” but has two 
levels, the political and the religious, philosophical, etc. or else 
one level of institutions and another of ideas (Engels, Plekh-
anov, Kautsky, Althusser, etc.).
 4. Whether or not the ideas of a class are ideological depends 
on whether its ascendancy is functional or dysfunctional for the 
further development of the productive forces (Kautsky).
 5. Ideology is not a critical concept. Ideologies are not distin-
guished from other non-scientific ideas by the false beliefs they 
contain, and socialism and Marxism are proletarian ideologies. 
The working-class movement demonstrates the inferiority of 
bourgeois ideology either by its ethical superiority (Bernstein) 
or by its historical success (Lenin).
 6. The character of ideology present in a society is explained 
by its function of promoting interests, and in a class society is 
explained by the state of the class struggle (Lenin).
 7. Class consciousness is explained primarily by the power 
of the ideologies required by the state of the class struggle 
(Lenin).
 8. False consciousness is class consciousness that does not 
correspond to the ideology required by a class’s historical role 
(Lenin, Lukacs).
 9. Socialist ideology is developed by revolutionary intellec-
tuals quite independently of the development of the working-
class movement (Lenin).
 10. The truth of historical materialism is not to be judged by 
epistemological criteria modeled on the methods of natural sci-
ence, which are superstructural phenomena reflecting reified 
consciousness or bourgeois ideology, but it can be vindicated 
within a dialectical philosophy of praxis (Lukacs, Gramsci).
 11. The dominant ideology thesis: the stability of a class 
society can be explained primarily by the effects of ideology 
(Gramsci, Marcuse, Althusser).
 12. Ideology, like the economy, may or may not be the domi-
nant structure level in a society, and thus secures its social 
cohesion depending on economic conditions (Althusser).
 13. Ideology is both defective and necessary in any human 
society, even a communist one, to sustain the illusion that the 
individual “bearers” of social structures are the “subjects” 
of social action (Althusser). Torrance 1995: 27–28, Neacsu, 
89–90 (2020).
14 Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, 
active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up 
to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than 
conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-pro-
cess. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-
down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much 
from their historical life- process as the inversion of objects on the 
retina does from their physical life-process.
 Marx K. and Engels, Fr. (2001[1846]).The German ideology, 68 
(edited and with an introduction by C. J. Arthur) Electric Book Co., 
London.
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on this issue. Like Wells (1995), one might say that without 
Rousseau’s social contract, there would be little basis for citi-
zenship and “citizen” as a legal concept covering rights and 
duties, though few non-legal scholars mentioned this point. 
Moreover, scholars (Kelley 1994) have argued that centuries 
before the French revolution, the English philosophical and 
legal discourse of Locke made a significant contribution to 
the development of freedoms, including freedom of thought 
and access to knowledge for all.
The American concept of citizenship derives from both 
currents, especially from Lockean liberalism (e.g., Smith 
1997). In his study of the USA in the 1830s, de Tocqueville 
noted (1969[1835/40]) the citizens’ active participation in 
democratic self-governance. He wrote that the American 
citizens’ involvement in public life was viewed as a spe-
cial duty, which carried personal rewards. In participating 
in the governing process, people became connected to each 
other and developed as individuals. The American Revolu-
tion extolled this type of citizenship with a legal and ethical 
dimension, which presumed an individual desire to use and 
develop new civic virtues, including the one of informed 
participation in the act of governing.
Republicanism encourages both that citizens participate 
in the act of governing and that the government represents 
their will. And as many (e.g., Fritz 1997) have noticed it, 
since 1776, democracy has been a balancing act of how to 
determine and realize the will of the people. For Mort Hor-
witz, this act is derived from the ethos of a society, and not 
from how its institutions function (1966). Thus, he thinks 
that threats to freedom cannot be easily overcome by writ-
ing more perfect constitutions or laws, as Madison thought, 
because as Tocqueville noted, in a civilized society, des-
potism is attained not through torturing its citizens but by 
eroding their spirit. Or, if despotism were to be established 
among the democratic nations of our day, it might assume a 
different character; it would be more extensive and milder; 
it would degrade men without tormenting them.
Aesthetically, if despotism were to succeed today, it 
would affect our standards of beauty: from maternal to bar-
ren, from inclusive to exclusive, from hopeful civic engage-
ment to disdainful and apocalyptic. When the transition from 
Obama’s politics of hope and inclusion to Trumps’ politics 
of doubt, confusion, and cynicism: the constant attack on 
reality to adapt it to the needs of the dispossessed not by 
improving their reality, but offering them a destructive nar-
rative to affect all. When climate change is presented as a 
hoax and the science behind it ignored, destruction levels the 
playfield. Ironically, as Hannah Arendt would say in the Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism (1951), when citizens’ engagement 
is leveled down to mass engagement and specific political 
interests with specific end goals are replaced by masses 
interpellated by cynical perversions of reality, democracy 
suffers. From this perspective, Trumpism, the aesthetic 
ideology of negativity, while it has energized masses to lev-
els unseen in American politics, it has damaged democracy 
everywhere.
Luckily, engaged citizenship is a malleable institution, 
as the results of the 2020 Presidential Election show: the 
2020 election set a voter turnout record. In a referendum 
of Trumpism, engaged citizens rejected its values. Citizen-
ship encourages democratic civic participation and when 
supported by the citizens’ access to information, a better 
social contract or compact is achieved. Peter Dahlgren ana-
lyzed “civic agency and civic  competence” (267–286, 2006), 
pointing out its vital role in a democracy. Building on this 
foundation, environmental activism appears as a bridge 
between agency and competence in achieving ecojustice, or 
an ideal of climate stability.
Through engaged citizenship, climate stability, an ideal 
of beauty ideologically colored could become an end goal. 
It transcends the ethical and the political. And it builds on 
environmental aesthetics, viewed as a sustainable ideal for 
everyone to enjoy.
Instead of conclusion
To most people, Santayana argued:
the stars are beautiful; but if you asked them why, they 
would be at a loss to reply until they remembered what they 
had heard about astronomy […] (Santayana, 64, 1896).
People might offer some other impressive facts they admire 
and try to remember, but really, we do not understand how it all 
connects to produce that sensation of beauty and especially acqui-
escence. We can thus agree on the beauty of nature and derive 
pleasure from it without too much knowledge, and irrespective of 
our political views, or despite them. Enjoying nature, we experi-
ence complex emotions of beauty influenced ideologically.
Where ideology cannot produce solidarity of vision and 
action, aesthetics might stimulate our action. Sustainable 
capitalism, as an era of the Anthropocene, ironically, seems 
to need civic activism (Atapattu et al. 2020). In Juliana, one 
may never really know what caused the “primitive accu-
mulation” of dislike, to paraphrase Marx in Capital, vol. 1 
(1867, [1887]),15 to undo the amazing aesthetic result pro-
duced by the lower court’s decision. Sometimes a grain of 
sand inside an oyster produces a pearl, but most of the times 
it just irritates a fellow dining on oysters. Environmentally 
engaged citizenship needs to use both situations to preserve 
what we have for each one and for all of us.
15 Marx, K. (1887) Capital. Vol. 1, (Translated: Samuel Moore and 
Edward Aveling, edited by Frederick Engels) Progress Publishers, 
Moscow, USSR; https:// www. marxi sts. org/ archi ve/ marx/ works/ downl 
oad/ pdf/ Capit al- Volume- I.pdf.
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Santayana observed that to be successful, no theory can 
ever end in absolute knowledge of fact (Santayana, 64, 
1896). That is why it incorporates images, and it produces 
concepts with the hope of weaving in a strong imagination 
able to withhold its mirror into the real world, as well as to 
protect it from the changes that occur in the real world.
That is probably both hopeful and useful. Because while our 
intelligence is finite, our will is infinite, as Santayana reminds us 
Descartes’ words. And promoting ideals requires most people’s 
will. To fight climate change requires both our political will and 
our civic engagement. Armed with a sense of beauty understood 
as aesthetic ideology, environmentally engaged citizens can 
promote their ideal in such a manner as to produce the minimal 
resistance from opponents: emphasizing the pleasure of stability, 
inclusion, and perpetuity so that opponents cannot disagree 
with it. In other words, harmonizing interests for the good of 
the planet, and thus for all of us, we can envisage environmental 
law and environmentalism as a way of living beautifully.
Acknowledgements Dana would like to thank her students from the 
Environmental Law, Policy, and Decision-making class (Barnard Col-
lege/Columbia University), Spring 2020 & 2021, Environmental Sci-
ence Department, helmed by Professor Martin Stute, Ph.D., and Brian 
Mailloux, Ph.D.), Contemporary Civilization - (Columbia University, 
Spring & Fall 2021, and Associate Dean and Director of the Center for 
the Core Curriculum, Larry Jackson, Ph.D.), and the American Govern-
ance in the Anthropocene class (Fall 2020, (Universitatea București, 
Facultatea de Științe Politice/University of Bucharest, Faculty of Politi-
cal Sciences), under the guidance of Dean, Professor Cristian Preda, 
Ph.D.), for their inspirational dedication to scholarship and learning, 
environmental studies, and civic engagement, as well as Columbia Law 
Professor—Michael Gerrard, for his unflinching support and guid-
ance of my research, teaching, and scholarship. An earlier version of 
this article was presented to the WSPA 2020 digital conference at the 
height of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some of that pathos is still present 
in these pages: Why don't we all go outside and get ourselves some 
glory finding meaning and beauty in preserving nature for those com-
ing after us? Peter Bower, you are such an inspiration. Without Izzie, 
ZouZou, and Absy, little would make sense.
Declarations 
Ethics approval Not applicable.
Consent to participate Not applicable.
Conflict of interest The authors declare no competing interests.
References
Arendt H (1951) Origins of totalitarianism. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 
New York
Arnett WE (1989) George Santayana, The sense of beauty: being the 
outlines of aesthetic theory, critical edition (Book Review).Trans. 
Charles S. Peirce Soc. 25: 538–545.
Arnett WE (1955) Santayana and the sense of beauty. Indiana Univer-
sity Press: Bloomington
Ashmore J (1966) Santayana, art, and aesthetics. Cleveland Press of 
Western Reserve University: Cleveland
Atapattu SA et al. (2020) Intersections of environmental justice and 
sustainable development. Framing the issues in The Cambridge 
handbook of environmental justice and sustainable (ed. S.A. Ata-
patt et. Al.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Bahm JA (1947) Beauty defined. Philos Rev 56:582–586
Baichwal J (2019) Anthropocene: the human epoch. A film by Jen-
nifer Baichwal, Nicholas de Pencier, Edward Burtynsky; writer, 
Jennifer Baichwal; producer, Nicholas de Pencier. Kino Lorber, 
New York
Blitzer R (2019) (Fox News) Trump heads into 2020 with ‘historic’ 
judicial appointments. https:// www. foxne ws. com/ polit ics/ trump 
heads- into- 2020- with- histo ric- judic ial- appoi ntmen ts. Accessed 
21 Nov 2021
Blumm M, Wood MC (2017) “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: climate change, 
due process, and the public trust doctrine. Am Univ l Rev 
67(1):1–87
Buell L (1995) The environmental imagination: Thoreau, nature 
writing, and the formation of American culture. Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Caron JE (2021) Satire as the comic public sphere: postmodern 
“truthiness” and civic engagement. The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, University Park.
Carson R (2018) Silent spring & other writings on the environment 
(Sandra Steingraber, ed.) The Library of America, New York
Cassuto DN (2004) The law of words: standing, environment, and 
other contested terms. Harv Envtl l Rev 28:79–128
Craig RK (2020) Juliana, climate change, and the constitution. Nat 
Res & Env 35:53–55
Dahlgren, P. (2006) Doing citizenship: the cultural origins of civic 
agency in the public sphere. European J. Cultural Studies 9:267-
286. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1177/ 13675 49406 066073
Dutta J et al. (2020) COVID-19 and emerging environmental trends. 
A way forward. CRC Press, Boca Raton.
Elster J (1985) Making sense of Marx. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
Flanagan C (2020) Melania’s Plastic Camelot. The Atlantic https:// 
www. theat lantic. com/ ideas/ archi ve/ 2020/ 10/ melan ia- and- steph 
aniea nd- me/ 616878/. Accessed 21 Nov 2021
Frankfurt HG (2005) On bullshit Princeton. University Press, 
Princeton
Fritz CG (1997) Alternative visions of American constitutional-
ism: popular sovereignty and the early American constitutional 
debate. Hastings Const l Quarterly 24:287–357
Fuchs C (2021) How did Donald Trump incite a coup attempt? tri-
pleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. 19(1): 246–251 
https:// www. triple- c. at/ index. php/ tripl eC/ artic le/ downl oad/ 
1239/ 1425
Geertz C (1973) The interpretation of cultures; selected essays. Basic 
Books, New York
Ghista DN (2004) Socio-economic democracy and the world govern-
ment [electronic resource] : collective capitalism, depovertization, 
human rights, template for sustainable peace. World Scientific: 
Singapore
Grad FP (1971) Law and the environment edited by Malcolm F. Bald-
win and James K. Page, Jr., 1970 Colum. L. Rev. 71:1542-48. 
https:// doi. org/ 10. 2307/ 11215 15
Horwitz M (1966) Tocqueville and the tyranny of the majority. Rev 
Politics 28:293–307 https:// www. jstor. org/ stable/ 14055 88
Juliana v. U.S., (2016) No. 6:15-cv-1517-TC.  https:// stati c1. squar 
espace. com/ static/ 571d1 09b04 42627 0152f ebe0/t/ 5824e 85e6a 
49638 292dd d1c9/ 14788 13795 912/ Order+ MTD. Aiken. pdf, and 
F. Supp. 3d 217: 1224–1276 District Oregon, Oregon https:// caset 
ext. com/ case/ julia na-v- united- states-3. rev’d and remanded, Juli-
ana v. U.S., (2020) Federal Reporter, 3 947:1159-1191 9th Cir., 
Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 
1 3
https:// cdn. ca9. uscou rts. gov/ datas tore/ opini ons/ 2020/ 01/ 17/ 18- 
36082. pdf
Kelley DR (1994) Citizenship in the western tradition. American Hist 
Rev 99:521–522
Knott S (2019) George H. W. Bush: Domestic affairs https:// mille rcent 
er. org/ presi dent/ bush/ domes tic- affai rs
Knott S (2019) George H. W. Bush: Domestic affairs https:// mille rcent 
er. org/ presi dent/ bush/ domes tic- affai rs
Lazarus RJ (2020) The rule of five: making climate history at the 
Supreme Court. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge
Leopold A (1966) A Sand County almanac: with other essays on con-
servation from Round River Oxford University Press, New York
Lohse D (2017) The most important lawsuit on the planet. Santa Clara 
Magazine: Sept. 28, 2017. https:// magaz ine. scu. edu/ magaz ines/ 
fall- 2017/ the- most- impor tant- lawsu it- on- the- planet/. Accessed 
21 Nov 2021
Luke TW (2019) Anthropocene alerts: critical theory of the contempo-
rary as ecocritique Telos Press Publishing, Candor
Mank BC (2020) Can judges use due process concepts in Obergefell 
to impose judicial regulation of greenhouse gases and climate 
change?: the crucial case of Juliana v. United States. Belmont l 
Rev 7:277–307
Marx K. and Engels F. (2001[1846]) The German ideology, edited and 
with an introduction by C. J. Arthur. Electric Book Co., London
Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 (2007) https:// www. supre mecou rt. 
gov/ opini ons/ 06pdf/ 05- 1120. pdf; United States Reports 549:497-
560 United States Supreme Court
Neacşu D (2020) The bourgeois charm of Karl Marx & the ideological 
irony of American jurisprudence Brill, Leiden
Neacşu D (2011) Political satire and political news: entertaining, acci-
dentally reporting or both?: The case of the Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart (TDS). Thesis (Ph.D.) Rutgers University, New Brun-
swick. https:// doi. org/ 10. 7916/ D8959 RJ7
Nixon R (1973) Public papers of the presidents of the United States, 
Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archives and 
Records Service, General Services Administration, U.S. G.P.O.
Obama B (2008) Transcript - Barack Obama’s remarks in St. Paul, New 
York Times: June 3, 2008. https:// www. nytim es. com/ 2008/ 06/ 03/ 
us/ polit ics/ 03text- obama. html. Accessed 21 Nov 2021
Obergefell v. Hodges, (2015) https:// www. supre mecou rt. gov/ opini ons/ 
14pdf/ 14- 556_ 3204. pdf; United States Reports: 576: 644-742 
United States Supreme Court
Ortiz, M. (2017) Climate litigation and atmospheric ethics: a case study 
of Juliana v. United States. The University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 10607567 Paris 
Agreement (April 22, 2016). https:// treat ies. un. org/ doc/ Publi 
cation/ MTDSG/ Volume% 20II/ Chapt er% 20XXV II/ XXVII-7- d. 
en. pdf. Accessed 21 Nov 2021
Paris Agreement signature ceremony (April 22, 2016) https:// newsr 
oom. unfccc. int/ media/ 632121/ list- of- repre senta tives- to- high- level 
signa ture- cerem ony. pdf. Accessed 21 Nov 2021
Pace BJ (2019) The children’s climate lawsuit: a critique of the sub-
stance and science of the preeminent atmospheric trust litigation 
case, Juliana v. United States Idaho l Rev 55:85–114
Purdy J (2015) After nature. A politics for the Anthropocene. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge
Santayana G (1896) The sense of beauty; being the outlines of aesthetic 
theory. C. Scribner’s Sons: New York
Santayana G (1905) Reason in art. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge
Santayana G (1910) Three philosophical poets. Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge
Santayana G (1922a) Soliloquiea in England and later soliloquies. C. 
Scribner’s Sons: New York
Santayana G (1922b) The life of reason. C. Scribner’s Sons: New York
Santayana, G. (1951) The philosophy of George Santayana (Schilpp, 
P. A. ed.) Tudor Pub. Co.: New York
Schudson M (1998) The good citizen: a history of American civic life. 
Martin Kessler Books, New York
Schwartz J (2020) The ‘Profoundly Radical’ message of Earth Day’s 
first organizer, The New York Times: April 20, 2020. https:// 
www. nyten is- hayes- earth- day- organ izer. htmli mes. com/ 2020/ 04/ 
20/ clima te/d
Shear MD, Sullivan E (2018) ‘Horseface,’ ‘Lowlife,’ ‘Fat, Ugly’: how 
the President demeans women, The New York Times: October 
16, 2018, https:// www. nytim es. com/ 2018/ 10/ 16/ us/ polit ics/ trump- 
women- insul ts. html
Smith R (1997) Civic ideals: conflicting visions of citizenship in U.S. 
history Yale University Press: New Haven
Starr P (2004) The creation of the media. Political origins of modern 
communications. Basic Books: Cambridge
Stegner W (1980) Twilight of self-reliance: frontier values and contem-
porary America. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values delivered 
at the University of Utah. February 25, 1980 https:// tanne rlect 
ures. utah. edu/_ resou rces/ docum ents/a- to-z/ s/ stegn er81. pdf
Tocqueville A. de. (1969[1835/40]) Democracy in America (2 vols., ed. 
J.P. Mayer, trans. G. Lawrence). Doubleday: Garden City
de Tracy, DALC (1817) Élements d’ideologie. 1. Courcier, Paris
Turner, J.M. (2018) The Republican reversal: conservatives and the 
environment from Nixon to Trump. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge
U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (1973) 
United States reports 412:669–734. https:// tile. loc. gov/ stora geser 
vices/ servi ce/ ll/ usrep/ usrep 412/ usrep 412669/ usrep 412669. pdf; 
United States reports 412:669–734 United States Supreme Court
Wells CC (1995) Law and citizenship in early modern France, The John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
Whalen E (2016) ‘Groundbreaking’ means ‘insane’? National Review, 
Nov. 21, 2016. https:// www. natio nalre view. com/ bench- memos/ 
aiken- oregon- clima te- change- ruling- julia na/. Accessed 21 Nov 
2021
Wittgenstein L (1958) Philosophical investigations, trans. G.E.M. Ans-
combe. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
